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Abstract  
Corruption and its practices in Nigeria have become systemic in both 
public and private sectors. Following the consolidation of democracy in the 
country since 1999 to date, there is a problem as to whether democratic 
stability has helped in mitigating the impact of corruption on economic 
growth. The main objective of this study is to identify whether democratic 
stability helps in mitigating the impact of corruption on Economic growth in 
Nigeria. Annual time series data on real GDP growth rate, corruption 
perception index (proxy for corruption), life expectancy at birth, population 
growth rate and government expenditure were the variables used for the study, 
covering the period 1996-2017. Dummy variable was also used as a proxy for 
democracy. To analyse the data, Autoregressive Distributed lag (ARDL) 
model was adopted. The empirical results show that corruption has negative 
impact on economic growth, implying that increase in corruption decreases 
economic growth; and that democratic stability helps in mitigating the impact 
of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria during the period covered by the 
study. The study, therefore, recommends that the government should enforce 
the democratic principles such as the rule of law, government’s responsiveness 
to public opinion, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and most 
importantly, political participation by the citizens. Such democratic principles, 
when enforced, will provide more stable environment for investments and 
hence promote growth. The various anti-corruption agencies like the EFCC 
and ICPC should also, without fear or favour, bring to book all corrupt 
politicians and bureaucrats in our public service. 
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Introduction 
1. Background of the Study. 
One of the major macroeconomic policy objectives of every country is 
to achieve rapid economic growth. However, one of the major factors 
inhibiting growth in Nigeria as stated in the National Economic Empowerment 
and Development Strategy (NEEDS) macroeconomic framework (2004) is 
pervasive rent- seeking and corruption. This has made growth of the Nigerian 
economy to be disappointing in recent years. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Annual Report (2017) shows that 
real GDP growth rate in 2013 is 5.5 percent. This increased to 6.2 percent in 
2014 but declined to 2.8 percent in 2015. It recorded a negative growth rate of 
-1.6 percent in 2016 and slow growth of 0.8 in 2017. 
The political Bureau of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in its 1987 
report, outlines the multifarious manifestation of corruption to include: the 
inflation of government contracts in return for kickbacks; fraud and 
falsification of accounts in the public service; examination malpractices in our 
educational institutions, the taking of bribes and perversion of justice among 
the police, the judiciary and other organs for administering justice; and various 
heinous crimes against the state in business and industrial sectors of the 
economy. These include collusion with multinational companies such as over-
invoicing of goods, foreign exchange swindling, hoarding and smuggling. 
This definition is broad because it covers all facets of corruption in the 
country. 
World Bank (1997) defines corruption as the abuse of public office for 
private gains. Public office, in this context, is abused when private agents 
actively accepts, solicits and extorts a bribe. Hence, Rose-Ackerman (1999) 
notes that corruption exists when institutions established to regulate the 
interrelationships between the citizens and states are used instead for personal 
enrichment and provision of benefits to the corrupt and undeserving. 
In line with the above, El-Rufai (2003) notes that corruption in Nigeria 
covers a wide range of social misconduct ranging from embezzlement, 
bribery, nepotism, influence, peddling, bestowing of favours to friends, 
rigging of elections, abuse of public property, sale of fake or expired drugs, 
etc. 
The Transparency International (TI)’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
which is used as a proxy for corruption, categorises corruption into three parts  
a. Grand Corruption: This refers to acts committed at high level of 
government that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, 
enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good. 
b. Petty Corruption: This refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power 
by low and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary 
citizens … often trying to access basic public goods and services. 
European Scientific Journal November 2019 edition Vol.15, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
108 
c. Political corruption: This refers to manipulation of policies, 
institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and 
financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to 
sustain their power, status and wealth. 
 
1.1  Statement of the Problem 
 The unnerving effects of corruption and democratization process in 
Nigeria have continued to attract national discourse in recent years. This is 
because corruption undermines the integrity of government and public 
institutions.  
Obasanjo (2000), notes that corruption has been responsible for the 
political instability of successive governments in Nigeria since the First 
Republic. NEEDS (2004:8) reports that more than 200 Nigerians were being 
detained or tried for fraud, and for illegally obtained assets worth more than 
$500million which has been confisticated. 
` Following the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria since 1999, 
corruption and financial crimes are being vigorously tackled. The government 
in power in 1999 instituted anti-graft agencies aimed at fighting corruption in 
the country. They include: The Independent Corrupt Practices and other 
Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in the year 2000; Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Establishment Act (2004) and Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act (2004). In the same vein, the current government 
in power, on assuming office in May 2015, launched anti-corruption drive in 
the country. 
 In recent years, Nigeria has been rated as one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world by the Transparency International (TI). In 2013, Nigeria 
came 144th out of 177 countries that were assessed. In 2014, she came 136th 
out 175 countries; 136th out of 168 countries in 2015; 136th out of 176 countries 
surveyed in 2016; and 148th out of 180 countries that were assessed in 2017. 
 Since Nigeria has been experiencing stable democracy (Uninterrupted 
civilian rule) since 1999 to date, it is useful to assess whether democratic 
stability has helped in mitigating the impact of corruption on economic growth 
in Nigeria. 
 
1.2  Objectives of the Study 
 This study intends to achieve the following objectives. 
1. To analyse the impact of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria. 
2. To identify whether democratic stability helps in mitigating the impact 
of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria.  
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This research is divided into five sections. Section one is the 
introductory section, which comprises the background of the study, statement 
of the problem and objectives of the study. Section two is the literature review, 
which comprises the theoretical and empirical literature. Section three presents 
the methodology, showing the basic model and its specification and the 
analytical framework. Section four presents and discusses the results of the 
findings, while the last section, section five, presents the summary of the 
findings, conclusion and recommendations 
 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1  Theoretical Literature  
   A good number of scholars emphasise the impact of corruption on 
economic growth from theoretical perspective. The debates focus on two 
competing hypotheses, whether corruption ‘greases the wheels’ or ‘sands the 
wheels’ of bureaucracy. Scholars in the first stream of debate argue that 
corruption eliminates the bureaucratic structure that delays the financial 
decisions and prevents investment and thus, accelerates growth (leff, 1964; 
Nye, 1967; Huntington, 1968; leys, 1970; lui, 1985, Wedeman, 1997; Meon 
and Sekkat, 2005). For instance, leff (1964), Nye (1967), Huntington (1968) 
argue that bribery may decease bureaucratic costs and accelerate efficient 
public administration. They note that as bureaucratic procedures are 
stimulated and bureaucratic costs drop, economic growth is promoted. Thus, 
these scholars are aligned with the hypothesis that corruption greases the 
wheels of bureaucracy, which implies that corruption has positive impact on 
economic growth.  
Scholars in the second stream of debate argue that corruption can be 
fatal to economic activity because it makes bureaucratic procedures sluggish, 
expensive, and inefficient and also diverts resources to unproductive activities 
(Myrdal, 1968; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; and 
Mauro, 1998). For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that resources 
may be shifted away from productive activities (education and health) to 
potentially useless projects (defence) if meaningful secrecy in the latter is 
easier. In line with the above, Hodge, Sriran Shankar, Prasada and Alan (2011) 
argue that corruption emerges as a negative construct that erodes property 
rights, harms political institutions and complicates the nature of economic 
development. These scholars are aligned with the hypothesis that corruption 
sands the wheels of bureaucracy, which implies that corruption has negative 
impact on economic growth. 
 The foregoing shows that both ‘greases the wheels’ (positive impact of 
corruption on Economic growth) and ‘sands the wheels’ (Negative impact of 
corruption on economic growth) lies in the interaction between corruption and 
institutional feature (democracy) (Shabbir, 2017). This study incorporates the 
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institutional  feature (democracy) in order to identify which of the hypotheses 
holds for Nigeria.  
 
2.2  Empirical Literature 
There has been existing controversy on the relationship between 
corruption, democracy and economic growth. Scholars in the first stream of 
debate argue, through their empirical studies, that corruption can affect 
economic growth negatively. The scholars in this first school include Mauro 
(1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mo (2001), Isse and Abdiweli (2003) and 
Omenka (2013). 
 In an empirical work on the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth, Mauro (1995) finds that there is a statistically negative 
effect of corruption on private investment rates. He notes that the cause of low 
investment is primarily due to institutional inefficiency.  
In their analysis on the impact of corruption on economic growth, knack and 
Keefer (1995) included other indicators such as the performance of the 
bureaucracy, voice and accountability and security of property rights. They 
used political risks services as a proxy for corruption. The results show that 
corruption has a negative effect on economic growth.  
MO (2001),  in an empirical study on the impact of corruption on 
economic growth and the importance of transmission channels,  finds that 
increase in corruption leads to lower economic growth and that political 
instability is one of the most important channels through which corruption 
affects economic growth.  
In their study on the determinants of economic corruption, which 
involves cross-country comparison, Isse and Abdiweli (2003) find that 
corruption has negative and statistically significant effect on economic 
growth, the level of education, the legal effectiveness and economic freedom.  
In Nigeria, Omenka (2013) examines the effects of corruption on 
Nigeria’s development efforts. The study identifies the causes of corruption to 
include, poverty, pressure from families, communities’ ethnic loyalties, 
among others. The result also shows that corruption leads to the depletion of 
national wealth.  
However, scholars in the second school argue that corruption has a 
positive effect on economic growth (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Leys, 
1970; Odubunmi and Agbelade, 2014; Oguonu and Ezeibe, 2014). Leff (1964) 
and Huntington (1968) note that corruption, essentially the speed money, can 
increase efficiency of the economic system. The speed money will help to 
reduce transaction costs and avoids bureaucratic delays. Thus, Leys (1970) 
argues that small side payments to the public office bearers could help in 
reducing the bureaucratic hindrances and thereby encouraging economic 
activity. Lui (1985) finds  that corruption can reduce waiting time. In line with 
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Lui (1985), Wedeman (1997) notes that the assumption that corruption 
systematically reduces growth is not entirely justified. He argues that many 
corrupt countries have growth rates high.  
Some of the Nigerian studies also found positive relationship between 
corruption and economic growth. Odubunmi and Agbelade (2014), in their 
investigation on the causality relationship between corruption and economic 
growth in Nigeria, find that there is a uni-directional casualty between the two 
variables, where causality runs from corruption to economic growth.  
Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014) examine the impact of political corruption 
on economic growth in Nigeria using data from documented evidence. 
Employing descriptive method, the result shows that there is a positive 
relationship between political corruption, democracy and economic growth 
and development in Nigeria.  
Studies have equally been conducted on the link between democracy, 
corruption and economic growth in different countries. Clague, Keefer, Knack 
and Olson (1996) note that democracy provides greater safety and security to 
implement property rights than authoritarian regime.  
Amira (2014) investigates the corruption’s and democracy’s effects on 
economic growth. The study utilized dynamic panel data approach for 42 
countries (18 democratic and 24 non-democratic countries) for the period 2000 
– 2011. The empirical results show that corruption has no significant effect on 
economic growth in democratic countries, while it has negative effect on 
economic growth in non-democratic countries that were sampled. 
Aminu, Gbenga and Bolaji (2014) investigate the impact of democracy 
on the performance of the Nigerian economy for the period 1983-1998 
(Military era) and 1999 – 2012 (Democracy era). The study adopted 
democracy led growth model, utilizing data on GDP (dependent variables) and 
poverty rate, unemployment rate,  corruption index and inflation rate as 
independent variables. Employing ordinary least squares (OlS) techniques, the 
results show that unemployment rate, inflation rate, poverty level and 
corruption level raise output in the economy, while change in democracy 
reduces output in the economy. The results also show that there is no causality 
relationship between GDP and democracy, a uni-directional causality exists 
between corruption and GDP, where causality runs from GDP to corruption. 
They also found that GDP is higher during democracy than during the military 
era.  
Shabbir (2017) examines corruption, democracy and economic growth 
in developing eight (D – 8) countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Turkey, Egyt, Iran, Nigeria and Pakistan). Data on growth rate of real GDP 
(dependent variable) and corruption index, government expenditure, 
investment – Output ratio, population growth rate and education level 
(independent variables) were collected. Generalized method of moment 
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(GMM) was used to estimate the panel data set. The empirical results indicate 
that democracy plays an essential role in determining the corruption-growth 
relationship.  
Aliyu (2017) investigates revenues reforms, corruption and economic 
growth in Nigeria for the period 1999 – 2016. Data on GDP, gross revenue to 
GDP, corruption perception index, non-oil revenue to GDP and polity 
democracy score as index of democracy were utilized in the analysis. 
Applying Vector Error Correction (VEC) model to analyse the data, the 
empirical results show a long run equilibrium relationship between economic 
growth and non-oil revenue, gross revenue, corruption and democracy in 
Nigeria. The results further reveal a negative impact of corruption on 
economic growth and positive impact of democracy on economic growth.  
 
3.  Methodology  
The methodology adopted in this research is purely econometrics, 
applying Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model procedure. The 
choice of ARDL is guided by the fact that it is suitable to small samples; the 
sample size for this study is small (1996 – 2017). The choice of this period is 
guided by the data availability on corruption perception index for Nigeria; the 
comprehensive data for Nigeria started in 1996. It is also applied irrespective 
of the order of integration of the variables, I (0) or I (1) (Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith, 2001). Most importantly, ARDL has the advantage of generating long 
run and short run results simultaneously. 
 
3.1.  Variable Description/Sources  
Table 1: List of variables, their definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Sources 
RGDPr  Real GDP growth rate.  Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical 
Bulletin, 2017  
CORRPUT  Corruption proxied by corruption 
perception index (CPI).  
Transparency International, 2017  
DEMO  Dummy variable for democracy; DEMO = 
1 from 1999 – 2017 and 0 for other years  
Constructed by the author  
LEXB Life Expectancy at Birth  CBN Annual Report (Various Issues)  
POPGR Population Growth Rate  CBN Annual Report (various issues)  
LGEXP  Government Expenditure (in logarithm)  CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2017  
 
3.2  Model Specification  
 This study adopted the corruption-Growth Model by Meon and Sekkat 
(2005). In the model, this study used corruption, democracy and interaction 
term (corruption* democracy) as determinants of real GDP growth rate to 
identify whether democratic stability helps in mitigating the impact of 
corruption on economic growth in Nigeria. 
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 The long run relationship between economic growth (RGDPr) and 
independent variables is specified below.  
RGDPrt  = β0 + β1 CORRUPTt + β2DEMOt + β3LEXBt +𝛽4POPGRt  + 
𝛽5LGEXPt + 𝛽6CORRUPT*DEMO +  𝜇t … 3.1 
Where, RGDPr, CORRUPT, DEMO, LEXB, POPGR and LGEXP are as 
defined above and CORRUPT*DEMO captures the interaction effect of 
corruption and democracy dummy.  
β0 is the constant intercept, while β1 – β6 are the coefficients of the variables 
respectively. 𝜇 is the error term and t is the time period.  
 
3.3  Economic a priori of the variables 
The coefficient of corruption (β1) is expected to be negative; an 
increase in corruption reduces economic growth and vice versa. The 
coefficient of democracy (𝛽2) is expected to be positive; democracy promotes 
economic growth. The coefficient of life expectancy at Birth (β3) is expected 
to be positive; healthy workers contribute to high productivity and thus, higher 
growth. The coefficient of population growth rate (β4) is expected to be 
positive; the higher the population growth, the higher the economic growth 
and vice versa. The coefficient of government expenditure (β5) is expected to 
be positive; the higher the government spending, the higher the growth. The 
coefficient of  interaction effect of corruption and democracy (𝛽6) is expected 
to be positive; when 𝛽1 is negative and 𝛽6 is positive, democracy mitigates the 
negative effect of corruption on growth.  
 
3.4  Method of Evaluation  
One of the conditions required for the application of ARDL is that none 
of the variables is integrated into order two, I(2). Hence, Augmented Dickey 
– Fuller (ADF) and Philips – Perron (PP) unit root tests were conducted before 
the application of ARDL approach to cointegration.  
Following Pesaran et al (2001), the ARDL format of equation 3.1 above 
becomes;  
∆RGDPrt = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 1∆RGDPrt – i+ ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 2∆CORRUPTt-i +∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 3∆ DEMOt-i + 
∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖−1 4∆LEXBt-i  +∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 5∆POPGRt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 6∆LGEXPt – i  + ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 7∆CORRUPT*DEMOt-
i +λ1RGDPrt + λ2CORRUPTt + λ3DEMOt  + λ4LEXBt + λ5POPGRt + λ6LEXPt + 
λ7CORRUPT*DEMO +  Σt … 3.2  
Where, t is time period, ∆ is first difference operator, βo is the constant 
intercept, β1 – β7, with summation signs, represent the short-run dynamics, 
while λ1 – λ7 represent the long run coefficients. Ps are the respective specific 
optimum lag orders and Σ is the error term. When cointegration between the 
dependent and independent variables exists, the error correction models 
(ECM), which describes the short run dynamics or adjustment of the 
cointegrated variables towards their equilibrium values, has to be estimated.  
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The general error correction representation of equation 3.2 is presented as:  
∆RGDPrt = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 1∆RGDPrt – i+ ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 2∆CORRUPTt-i +∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 3∆ DEMOt-i + 
∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖−1 4∆LEXBt-i  +∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 5∆POPGRt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 6∆LGEXPt – i  + ∑ 𝛽
𝑝
𝑖=1 7∆CORRUPT*DEMOt-
i + 𝜃ECMt-i + Σt … 3.3 
The lagged residual term (ECM) above shows the disequilibrium in long run 
relationship (𝜇t in equation 3.1).  
In estimating equation (3.3) above, the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
among the variables, defined by;  
Ho : λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = λ6 = λ7 = 0  
is tested against the alternative:  
H1 : λ1  = λ2 = λ3  = λ4 = λ5 = λ6 = λ7 ≠ 0   
F-test was conducted to test for cointegretion. This test has two sets of critical 
values; one set assumes that all variables are of order I(0) and the other set 
assumes that they are I(1). If the computed F – statistic falls above the upper 
bounds critical value, which corresponds to I(1) variables, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration is rejected. If the computed F – statistic falls below the 
lower bound, which corresponds to I(0), the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is not rejected. If the computed F – statistic falls between the two 
bounds, the result is inconclusive. The orders of the lags are selected by the 
Akaike information Criteria  
The coefficient of ECMt-1 is expected to be negative and fractional. It 
measures the speed of adjustment to equilibrium after a shock.  
 
3.5  Post Estimation Tests  
Robustness residual tests such as Ramsey Reset test (for Model 
specification), Jarque-Bera normality test, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
heteroscedasticity test and Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation 
were conducted.  
Econometric software used in the estimation is E-view, version 9.  
 
4.  Presentation And Analysis Of Results  
4.1  Descriptive Statistics   
Table 2. Result of the Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Media Maximu
m 
Minimu
m 
Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
RGDPR 5.727273 5.850000 14.60000 -
1.600000 
3.665045 0.191072 3.213481 
CORRUPT 2.050000 2.200000 2.800000 0.700000 0.618562 -0.585065 2.249177 
DEMO 0.863636 1.000000 1.00000 0.000000 0351250 -2.119252 5.491228 
LEXB 49.07273 49.10000 53.80000 42.50000 3.055546 -0.163794 2.141589 
POPGR 3.090909 3.100000 4.900000 2.800000 0.438514 3.312062 14.52945 
LGEXP 7.605335 7.686811 9.024263 5.820735 0.944796 -0.367722 1.928204 
Source: Author’s computation from E-view, version 9 
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The result of the descriptive statistics presented in table 2 above shows 
that life expectance at birth (LEXB) has the highest mean of 49.07. This is 
followed by government expenditure (LGEXP) with the mean of 7.61; real 
GDP growth rate (RGDP) with the mean of 5.73 and population growth rate 
(POPGR), which has the mean of 3.09. Democracy (DEMO) has the least 
mean of 0.86 followed by corruption with the mean of 2.05. RGDPr has the 
highest standard deviation; the higher the standard deviation, the higher the 
variability of the series. Democracy and corruption have the least variability 
with the standard deviations of 0.35 and 0.62 respectively.  RGDPr, POPGB 
and LEXB are positively skewed while corruption and democracy are 
negatively skewed, which implies that they are falling more than the other 
variables. The values of the kurtosis are different from 3, which is an 
indication of non-normal distribution for some of the series.  
 
4.2  Unit Root Tests 
 Unit root tests, applying Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) and 
Philips-Perron (PP), were conducted. This is to ensure that none of the 
variables is I (2), which is the condition for the application of ARDL 
procedure.  
Table 3. Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips- Perron (PP) Unit Root 
Test       
 ADF Statistic (with 
trend & Intercept)  
PP Statistic (with 
trend & intercept)  
Order of 
Integration 
Variables Level First 
difference 
Level  First 
difference 
 
RGDPr -1.89296 -5.418327 -2.813090 -9.9208383 I (1) 
CORRUPT -3.229651 -5.76375 -3.427872 -5.055897 I (1) 
POGR -4.160877 -7.018123 -4.160877 -18.46702 I (0) 
LEXB -6.343930 -30.20406 -3.724279 -9.131202 I (0) 
LGEXP -2.897553 -7.435472 -2.813090 -9.920838 I (1) 
MacKinnon critical values are: - 4.498307 (1%), -3.658446 (5%) and -3.268973 (10%) for RGDPr, 
CORRUPT & LGEXP – 4.467895 (1%), -3.644963 (5%) and 3.261452 (10%) for POPGR & LEXB 
Source: Author’s computation from E-view, version 9. 
 
The results of the unit root tests from both ADF and PP show that 
population growth rate (POPGR), which represents the growth of labour, and 
the life expectancy at birth (LEXB), which represents the health outcome, are 
stationary at levels. This means that they are I(0) variables, which implies that 
they do not contain unit root. On the other hand, the growth rate of real GDP, 
corruption  and government expenditure are stationary at first difference, that 
is, they are I(1) variables. Therefore, they contain unit root.  The existence of 
unit root in some of the variables necessitates the test for cointegration. This 
is in order to find out whether a linear combination of non-stationary variables 
could yield stationary in the long run.  
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4.3  Cointegration Test  
The results of the unit root tests above show that the series contain a 
mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables. Thus, ARDL approach is considered the 
most appropriate for testing for cointegration between the dependent and 
independent variables. The result of ARDL, applying the bounds test, is 
presented in Table 4. below:  
Table 4. Result of ARDL Bounds Test 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 07/01/19   Time: 12:03   
Sample: 1996 2017   
Included observations: 21   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  6.302938 5   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.26 3.35   
5% 2.62 3.79   
  
1% 3.41 4.68   
     
          
Source: Author’s Computation from E-view, version 9 
 
The result of the bounds test shows that the value of F-statistic is 
6.302938, which is higher than the upper bounds [1(1)] critical values at 5 
percent and I percent respectively. This implies that there is cointegration 
between economic growth (the dependent variable) and independent variables, 
which are corruption, democracy, life expectancy at birth, population growth 
rate and government expenditure. Therefore, there is long run relationship 
between economic growth and independent variables.  
Since cointegration between the variables has been established, the 
next step is to test for the short run and long run impact of corruption, 
democracy and other control variables (life expectancy at birth, population 
growth rate and government expenditure) on economic growth in Nigeria.  
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4.4  Presentation and Discussion of Results/Congruence with 
Empirical Studies  
Table 5. ARDL Short run and long run results 
(a) ARDL Short Run Result  
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: RGDPR   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)  
Date: 07/02/19   Time: 20:10   
Sample: 1996 2017   
Included observations: 21   
     
     Cointegrating Form 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(CORRUPT) -6.706663 23.441377 -0.286104 0.7801 
D(DEMO) -15.519750 43.428974 -0.357359 0.7276 
D(LEXB) -0.039441 0.458357 -0.086049 0.9330 
D(POPDR) -0.116649 0.975291 -0.119604 0.9070 
D(LGEXP) 5.077642 2.448644 2.073654 0.0624 
D(CORRUPT * DEMO) 5.353352 23.358550 0.229182 0.8229 
CointEq(-1) -0.683618 0.115333 -5.927313 0.0001 
     
      Cointeq = RGDPR - (-9.8105*CORRUPT  22.7024*DEMO3.7332*LEXB    
 -0.1706*POPDR + 7.4276*LGEXP + 13.7803*CORRUPT*DEMO+ 
 146.8624 ) 
   
(b) ARDL Long Run Result 
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     CORRUPT -9.810549 34.202233 -0.286839 0.7796 
DEMO -22.702388 63.338449 -0.358430 0.7268 
LEXB -3.733235 0.874375 -4.269603 0.0013 
POPDR -0.170635 1.427838 -0.119506 0.9070 
LGEXP 7.427606 3.616708 2.053692 0.0646 
CORRUPT*DEMO 13.780327 34.076757 0.404391 0.6937 
C 146.862405 71.338795 2.058661 0.0640 
     
     Source: Author’s Computation from E-view, version 9. 
 
The results of the short run and long rum of ARDL above show that 
corruption has negative impact on economic growth in Nigeria during the 
period covered by the study. This negative impact of corruption on economic 
growth agrees with the findings of the empirical studies by Mauro (1995), Mo 
(2001), Isse and Abdiweli (2003), Omenka (2013), and Aliyu (2017). 
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Therefore, the result of this study supports the hypothesis that corruption sands 
the wheels of bureaucracy in Nigeria. 
The coefficient of dummy variable interaction with corruption 
(CORRUPT* DEMO) is positive in both the short run and long run. Since the 
coefficient of corruption is negative and the coefficient of dummy variable 
interaction term is positive, democratic stability in Nigeria helps in mitigating 
the negative impact of corruption on economic growth in the country. This 
finding agrees with the result of the empirical study by Shabbir (2017), who 
finds that democracy plays an essential role in determining the corruption-
growth relationship.  
In the case of democracy, its impact on economic growth is negative 
both in the short run and long run. The negative sign of democracy deviates 
from the a priori expectation. This result is not surprising in Nigeria because 
the electoral process does not allow the citizens to expel the politicians who 
engage in corrupt practices. The negative sign of the coefficient of democracy 
agrees with the empirical findings by Aminu, Gbenga and Bolaji (2014), 
whose result shows that changes in democracy reduces output in the economy 
in Nigeria.  
Life expectancy has negative impact on economic growth in both short 
run and long run. In the long run, its impact on growth is negative and 
significant, with the probability value of 0.0013, which is less than 0.05 
significant level. The negative sign of the coefficient of life expectancy 
deviates from a priori expectation because life expectancy facilitates economic 
growth.  
Population growth rate has negative impact on economic growth in 
Nigeria in both the short run and long run. This is a deviation in the 
expectation. The implication of this finding is that the higher the rate of 
population growth, the more the number entering into labour market. Thus, for 
a given level of investment, each worker tends to have less capital stock which 
leads to low productivity level and hence, retards economic growth.  
Government expenditure has positive and fairly significant impact on 
economic growth in Nigeria. The probability values are 0.0624 and 0.0646 in 
the short run and long run respectively, which are significant only at 10 percent 
levels. The positive signs are in line with the a priori expectation because there 
is emphasis on private sector development in Nigeria. This lowers taxation 
and encourages private investment which promotes growth.  
The error correction term in correctly signed; it is negative and 
fractional. Its value is -0.683618, with the probability value of 0.0001, shows 
that it is significant. It shows that 68.4 percent of previous year shock is 
returned to equilibrium in current year. This implies that approximately 68.4 
percent of any disequilibrium in economic growth (RGDPr) is corrected by 
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the independent variables annually. This shows a high speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium after a shock.  
 
4.5  Robustness Tests  
The diagnostic tests conducted for robustness of the model include 
Jarque-Bera test for normality, Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test, 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity and Ramsey Reset test for 
model specification.  
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1997 2017
Observations 21
Mean       9.50e-15
Median  -4.26e-14
Maximum  2.915673
Minimum -2.002909
Std. Dev.   1.214648
Skewness   0.847083
Kurtosis   3.829865
Jarque-Bera  3.114015
Probability  0.210766
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.948136     Prob. F(2,9) 0.4230 
Obs*R-squared 3.654617     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.1608 
     
     Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 0.490953     Prob. F(9,11) 0.8525 
Obs*R-squared 6.018076     Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.7381 
Scaled explained SS 2.336362     Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.9850 
     
     Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: UNTITLED   
Specification: RGDPR  RGDPR(-1) CORRUPT DEMO LEXB LEXB(-1) 
        POPDR LGEXP CORRUPT*DEMO CORRUPT(-1)*DEMO(-1) C  
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  1.775054  10  0.1063  
F-statistic  3.150817 (1, 10)  0.1063  
Source: Author’s Computation from E-view version 9. 
 
The probability values of the various diagnostic tests above are greater 
than 0.05 respectively. This implies that the residuals are normally distributed, 
there is no serial correlation problem and that the residuals are 
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homosecedastic. It also implies that the functional form of the model is well 
specified. The foregoing shows that the results of the parameter estimates are 
valid and can be used for forecast and policy formulations.  
 
5.  Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations  
5.1  Summary of Findings  and Conclusion. 
The study examines the impact of corruption on economic growth in 
Nigeria’s stable democracy for the period 1996 – 2017. Annual time series 
data on corruption perception index, which were collected from Transparency 
International, were used to measure corruption. Data for the dependent 
variable (real GDP growth rate) and other control variables (life expectancy at 
birth, population growth rate and government expenditure) were collected 
from CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2017 edition and Annual Report (various 
issues). A dummy variable for democracy was also used to assess whether 
democracy helps in mitigating the negative effect of corruption on economic 
growth in Nigeria.  
The empirical results show that there is long run relationship between 
economic growth and independent variables (corruption, democracy, life 
expectancy at birth, population growth rate and government expenditure) in 
Nigeria during the period covered by the study. It is also found that corruption 
has negative impact on economic growth in Nigeria during the period covered 
by this study. The result also shows that democratic stability in Nigeria helps 
in mitigating the negative impact of corruption on economic growth in 
Nigeria. 
The results also show that life expectancy significantly retards economic 
growth in the long run; population growth rate retards economic growth in 
Nigeria; and that government expenditure improves economic growth in 
Nigeria.  
The conclusion drawn is that corruption retards economic growth in 
Nigeria, which is in line with the hypothesis that corruption sands the wheels 
of bureaucracy. Secondly, stable democracy in Nigeria helps in mitigating the 
negative effect of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria.  
 
5.2  Recommendations  
Based on the findings, the following recommendations are made:  
Corruption and democracy have negative impact on economic growth. This 
implies that the negative impact of corruption is worsened by the political 
process in which corruption occurs. Therefore, government efforts at curbing 
corruption should be intensified. The various anti-corruption agencies like the 
EFCC and ICPC should, without fear or favour, bring to book all corrupt 
politicians and bureaucrats in our public service.  
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The empirical result shows that democratic stability mitigates the 
negative impact of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria. The 
government should therefore enforce the democratic principles such as the rule 
of law, government responsiveness to public opinion; freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion and association, and most importantly, political 
participation by the citizens in the country. Such democratic principles, when 
enforced, will provide more stable environment for investments and hence, 
promote growth. 
Life expectancy at birth, which represents health outcome, has 
negative and significant impact on economic growth. The significant impact 
implies that such funds were allocated to the health sector while the negative 
impact implies diversion of such funds. The government, besides increasing 
budgeting allocation to health sector, should also monitor the end use of such 
funds in order to avoid diversion. This is because health sector spending is one 
of the indirect beneficial effects of democracy on growth.  
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